Can Israel Leverage the Fall of Assad to Promote Ties with Saudi Arabia?
Riyadh is interested in seeing post-Assad Syria rebuilt as a stable nation-state rather than becoming an exporter of political Islam. Assisting the Saudis in protecting their interests in Syria could yield dividends for Israel
This article examines the implications of the fall of the Assad dynasty's regime in Syria on the Saudi monarchy and the Kingdom’s political, security, and economic interests in Syria. The new regime in Damascus – established by the coalition of secular rebels and Islamist groups who ousted Assad in December 2024 – alongside Russia’s diminishing presence in the country and Turkey’s growing influence, all force Riyadh into several critical decisions that it will need to make in the near future. Within this context, Saudi-Israeli relations could potentially influence developments in Syria – while also being shaped by them.
The article first reviews relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria until the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and examines the Kingdom's interests in cooperating with Syria. Finally, it discusses the potential effects of Saudi-Israeli cooperation in Syria and how Israel could use it to advance its own interests.
Syria-Saudi Relations in the Past Century
Saudi Arabia and Syria have a long, complex and often tense history , stemming from differences in governance, security, and religious orientations, as well as conflicting interests.
In the 1950s and 1960s, Saudi Arabia saw itself as the leader of the Middle East Arab monarchies, while Syria – especially under President Hafez al-Assad, who rose to power in 1970 – positioned itself as the voice of Arab republics. During these years, Syria boasted its role as the guardian of "Arabism" – particularly after the Six-Day War in 1967, and even more so following Egypt’s "betrayal" in 1979, when it signed a peace agreement with Israel.
Additionally, Saudi Arabia is the the birthplace of the Prophet Muhammad and the guardian of Islam’s holy sites. The Kingdom’s founders adopted Wahhabism as the dominant religious ideology, though its influence has waned in recent years. In contrast, in the mid-20th century Syria embraced the secular Ba'th movement, and by the 1960s secularism and Marxism had become the dominant ideologies.
These stark differences bred mutual hostility, including Syrian subterfuge with its ally Egypt (before the 1979 peace agreement with Israel). At that time, both Saudi Arabia and Syria believed that toppling their rival’s regime would bolster their own standing, either by upending the monarchical order (for Syria) or by undermining the Arab republics (for Saudi Arabia).
Hafez al-Assad’s rise to power in Damascus in 1970 improved relations between the countries due to his pragmatic and generally more amicable policies (compared to his predecessors in the neo-Ba'thist regime). His approach aligned with Saudi Arabia’s desire for regional stability and a unified front against Israel. In return, the Kingdom provided economic and diplomatic support to Syria as part of its efforts to bolster its regional standing in the struggle against Israel.
Post-Cold War Relations
Regional and global events, particularly the Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, continued to strengthen cooperation between the two nations. Syria suddenly found itself without superpower patronage and exposed to the West and its allies, which led it to support the US-led coalition against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in Operation "Desert Storm" in 1991. However, the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000 and the rise of his son Bashar to power resulted in a gradual deterioration of relations.
Under Bashar, Syria began aligning with the Iran-led "Axis of Resistance," supporting Tehran’s regional proxies, including Shi'ite militias in Syria and Iraq and, most notably, Hezbollah in Lebanon.[1] Additionally, political divisions – such as Damascus’ opposition to Saudi peace initiatives with Israel, and Saudi suspicions of Syrian involvement in the 2005 assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, a long-time Saudi ally – led to a rift in relations, motivating Saudi Arabia to draw closer to the West. During this period, Riyadh also increasingly worked to position itself as the leader of the Arab world.[2]
Riyadh initially assisted the Assad regime during the Arab Spring uprising, but as the rebellion intensified it shifted its support to the local opposition
The Arab Spring uprisings of 2010-11 ultimately shattered relations between the two nations. Initially, Riyadh provided support to the Assad regime, fearing regional instability and the spread of Shi'ite protests in Bahrain. However, as the Syrian rebellion intensified, Saudi Arabia shifted its support to the local opposition, aiming to strengthen Sunni forces against Assad’s Alawite regime.
Between 2011 and 2016, Saudi policy became more assertive, including sanctions on Damascus and financial and military support for the opposition. Furthermore, it collaborated with Qatar and Türkiye to weaken and even overthrow Bashar al-Assad, while working to reduce Iran’s regional influence. During this period, Saudi Arabia also sought to claim another title for itself: leader of the Sunni Muslim world, opposing Iran’s leadership of Shi'ite Islam.
The cessation of Saudi support for Lebanon in 2017 following Hezbollah growing power and tightening grasp over the country; the Iranian missile and drone attack against Aramco (the Kingdom's national oil company) facilities in 2019; and Saudi Arabia's principled support for the "Abraham Accords" – further deteriorated the already-fragile relationship between Riyadh and Tehran. Simultaneously, tensions increased in Saudi Arabia’s relations with Syria, after Damascus became a central player in fostering Iran-Hezbollah relations and was one of the main opponents of the regional agreements signed with Israel.
Opportunities and Tensions: The Post-Assad Era
Saudi Arabia’s growing involvement in post-Assad Syria is driven by several interrelated factors: security and sectarian-religious concerns, geopolitical interests, and economic considerations.
Security Risks and Sectarian Tensions
The Syrian civil war, which erupted in 2011, generated two disturbing trends for Saudi Arabia:
Iran, through its support for the Assad regime, expanded its influence across the Middle East.
Sunnis in Syria faced brutal repression from the Alawite-led Assad regime, contributing to the rise of Sunni Salafi jihadist movements (as well as several Shi'ite groups).
The growing militancy of these groups within Syria, along with Iran’s expanding regional influence, has alarmed Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies, particularly the UAE, due to fears of jihadist spillover into neighboring countries and beyond. This concern drove Saudi Arabia to strengthen ties with the West and actively intervene in Syria’s civil war.
From Riyadh’s perspective, this intervention was necessary for security and economic reasons, as it viewed the Assad regime as serving Iranian interests. However, as the conflict grew increasingly sectarian, Riyadh utilized religious rhetoric and Islamism to justify its involvement.[3] In other words, one of Saudi Arabia's motivations for intervening on the side of the Syrian rebels was religion and sectarianism.[4]
Saudi Arabia currently leads the pragmatic Sunni bloc in the Middle East, largely due to its stance against Iran and jihadists – but primarily because of the strong ties most members of the bloc maintain with the West. Among other things, these ties have contributed to these states' relative openness toward Israel even during the tense period of the "Swords of Iron" war. As noted above, the key unifying factor for members of this bloc is their shared concern over Iran's growing influence in the Middle East and the proliferation of extremist movements.
In this regard, the rise of a new Sunni regime in Syria, with its jihadist Islamic background and factions, presents Saudi Arabia with a complex dilemma. On one hand, the new regime's policies could weaken the "Axis of Resistance" led by Iran and Hezbollah – a positive development for Saudi Arabia’s strategic interests. On the other hand, concerns over the spillover of extremist jihadis into other states in the region – and potentially even the Kingdom itself – heightens the need for a balanced solution.
In the past, Saudi Arabia sought to promote local Syrian forces such as "Jaish al-Islam," which were ideologically closer to its more moderate, middle-ground approach. However, the current situation requires a new path of action. Given Saudi Arabia’s extensive diplomatic experience and its regional and international standing, it may opt for a strategic approach that includes overtly supporting the new regime in Damascus.
Such support would be contingent on the establishment of governance and security mechanisms ensuring that the Shi'ite axis in Lebanon (namely Hezbollah and, to a lesser extent, the Amal movement) does not grow too powerful and, most importantly, does not continue to enjoy regular access to Iranian arms shipments as before. At the same time, Riyadh is likely to encourage the new Syrian regime to integrate more moderate forces into its political coalition, with the aim of promoting regional stability and mitigating the threat posed by extremist groups.
Geopolitical Interests
Saudi Arabia viewed the Syrian civil war as an opportunity to solidify its regional leadership in the Arab and Sunni Muslim worlds. The fall of the Assad regime represents a chance for the Saudis to advance this goal, alongside efforts to mend relations with Gulf partners, particularly Qatar.
Syria plays a crucial role in the Lebanese and Iraqi arenas, meaning that the ability to influence these countries via Damascus would serve Riyadh’s broader strategy – especially
vis-à-vis Iran. Saudi Arabia could pursue this goal by working to distance Syria’s nascent leadership from the Iranian-Shi'ite axis and from Türkiye, instead drawing it closer to the Arab world.
Moreover, ongoing competition with Qatar for regional and international influence necessitates swift Saudi action. Given Doha’s past involvement in Syria,[5] and its ability and experience in forming regional alliances, Riyadh may be compelled to act quickly – possibly in cooperation with the UAE – to reach understandings with Syria’s new government.
Economic Interests
Economic interests are also a not an insignificant factor for Saudi Arabia in considering its relations with post-Assad Syria. On one hand, the Kingdom has benefited from the Russian presence in Syria up until December 2024: the relationship between the two strengthened in light of the shared discourse on the future of the region from 2014 onward. This enabled them to grow closer and discuss common issues, primarily the global oil market.
Relations grew warmer in 2016 following an agreement between OPEC countries and non-OPEC members, among them Russia, on coordinated cuts in oil production. This historic event helped ease tensions between Saudi Arabia and Russia, two of the world's largest oil exporters, replacing them with cooperation. However, nowadays, with Russian influence waning and the potential for the Saudis to take their place, tensions could arise again between Riyadh and Moscow.[6]
Syria can also serve as an important avenue in Saudi Arabia's attempt to diversify its economy. Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman's vision of developing new economic sectors for the Kingdom by 2030 could receive a boost from the Syrian regime’s call for investments in its war-torn country. In this regard, Saudi Arabia has several advantages over Russia and Iran in the energy sector, as it is a significantly larger exporter than Iran and is not subject to international sanctions. Additionally, it can build a pipeline from its territory to Syria through Jordan—a move that would also benefit the latter economically.
Aramco has gained significant experience in recent years in establishing petrochemical plants and refineries, enabling Saudi Arabia to offer to rehabilitate some of Syria’s oil fields and potentially increase their output. Above all, Riyadh has the capability to establish vital energy and transport infrastructure, such as oil pipelines from eastern Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean coast, or the construction of highways from Saudi Arabia to Syrian ports to encourage trade between the two countries. This echoes the parameters laid out by former US President Joe Biden's "India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor" (IMEC) initiative.
Recent Saudi actions – such as its January 2025 call to lift economic sanctions on Syria,[7] and its delivery of humanitarian aid to assist the new government that same month – indicate a desire to influence Damascus and lay the groundwork for economic and political partnerships.[8]
Conclusion
Saudi-Syrian relations have undergone significant upheavals over the decades. Differences in political structures, alliances, and rivalries have mostly negatively shaped their interactions. However, recent shifts in both nations suggest that conditions are ripe for deeper cooperation.
With young, ambitious leaders at the helm of both countries, the potential for new relations is stronger than ever. A renewed engagement could shape joint responses to shared challenges, particularly regarding Iran and Hezbollah. However, it may also heighten tensions with Turkey and fuel regional competition with Qatar.
Israeli collaboration with the Saudis in Syria may lead them to soften their demand for a Palestinian state as a condition for normalizing relations
It is important to note that Saudi Arabia's main objective at the moment is to ensure that Syria does not become a state embracing and promoting political Islam. This aligns with its broader vision for the region – nation-states that prioritize their own stability, citizens, and economies. Riyadh would be willing to accept even a regime similar to the Ba'th Party over an Islamist one, as it prefers stability over a state controlled by political Islam.
In this context, Israel has the potential to be an important partner for the Saudis in balancing their two main interests – reducing the threat posed by Sunni political Islam that has taken hold in Syria on one hand, and countering the Shi'ite axis, represented by Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in Syria and Lebanon, on the other. If Israel acts carefully and discreetly, it could even assist Saudi Arabia in establishing its presence in Syria by mitigating threats to Saudi interests in the country – whether through intelligence cooperation or, if necessary, by force.
The fact that the new regime in Damascus is built upon a coalition that include Salafi jihadist groups further underscores the need for security cooperation between Israel and the moderate Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This is driven by concerns over losing their influence over the new rulers in the Syrian capital, or the potential spillover of radicalized elements into other countries in the region. The continued disruption of weapons smuggling from Iran to Hezbollah is therefore a Saudi interest just as much as it is an Israeli and regional priority.
Israeli cooperation with Saudi Arabia in the Syrian arena could take the form of a joint appeal to the United States; leveraging the positive relations that both Saudi Arabia and Israel have with Russia to advance their shared interests; and working together to prevent Iran and Qatar from gaining a foothold in Syria.
For Israel, the benefits of such collaboration may go beyond strengthening its strategic value in Riyadh’s eyes; it could also potentially lead to a softening of Saudi demands regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state as a condition for normalizing relations.
Dr. Yossi Mann is a senior research fellow at the Abba Eban Institute for Diplomacy & Foreign Relations, where he leads the Israel-Arab Gulf Program. He is a researcher at Bar-Ilan University and a lecturer at the School of Government at Reichman University. Previously, he served as Chair of the Middle Eastern Studies Department at Bar-Ilan University and the head of the Middle Eastern Studies program at Reichman University. His research focuses on society and economy in the Gulf region, with an emphasis on energy affairs, as well as the integration of artificial intelligence in qualitative research to assess social and economic developments in the region.
Notes:
[1] Joseph Mann, “The Syrian Neo-Ba’th regime and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1966-1970,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 5, September 2006, pp. 761-776.
[2] Yehuda U. Blanga, "Saudi Arabia Motives in the Syrian Civil War," Middle East Policy, Vol. 24, no.4, 2017, pp. 45-53.
[3] Line Khatib, "Syria, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and Qatar: the 'sectarianization' of the Syria conflict and undermining of democratization in the region," British journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46, no. 3, 2019, pp. 393-397.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Alberto Negri, “Gulf Cooperation Crisis: Qatar-Saudi Arabia Rivalry, Tensions within the Gulf Cooperation Council”, Geopolitical Overview, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Other Actors, Barcelona: The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), 2018, p.1. https://www.iemed.org/publication/gulf-regional-crisis-qatar-saudi-arabia-rivalry-tensions-within-the-gulf-cooperation-council/
[6] Joseph Mann, “Russia’s Policy toward OPEC,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.45, No. 6, 2009, pp. 985-1005.
[7] News Wires, “Saudi Arabia calls for Syria sanctions relief as Arab, EU diplomats gather in Riyadh,” France24, 12 January 2025. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250112-arab-eu-diplomats-in-saudi-for-talks-on-support-for-syria
[8] Laith Al-Jnaidi, “Saudi Arabia sends new aid plane for post Assad Syria”, Anadolu Ajansı, 29 January 2025. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/saudi-arabia-sends-new-aid-plane-for-post-assad-syria/3465646#
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